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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN T H E MATTER OF T H E
ESTATE AND GUARDIANS H I P OF JOAN OELERICH,
Incompetent.
H E L E N D. OELERICH,
I
Petitioner and Appellant, )

Case

N o

10005

vs.
JOAN OELERICH,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts, as presented by the appellant, although
seemingly true, do not clearly portray what the record
shows with respect to the issues involved in this matter.
Moreover, the appellant's Statement of Facts indeed
goes far beyond what is necessary for this appeal. What
is contemplated by Rule 74 (p) (2), U.R.C.P. is a concise statement of the facts of the case which are relevant
to the errors asserted for reversal and appellant has
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recited facts which have nothing to do with the appeal.
By way of illustration, on pages 4, 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief, there is a history of the respondent from
the time she was born until the time the petition for
appointment of guardian in this matter was filed. In
addition, on pages 9 and 10, quotations from an affidavit
by one Virginia Kelly can be found hinting of emotional
instability. As clearly pointed out by appellant, page
10 of her brief, there was no hearing on the merits
of the petition for letters of guardianship. Therefore,
there is no reason for including the above mentioned
statements relating to respondent's alleged incompetency. What is important are the facts surrounding
the dismissal of this petition by the court below and so
we move on to consider them.
The procedural steps as outlined by the appellant
were followed as stated. There are, however, significant
omissions which must be supplied to present the matter
fairly. I n that connection we mention that settlement
negotiations between the parties involved and their attorneys occurred between December 21, 1961, and April
17, 1962, the day the respondent testified. (R. 157-158).
A trust agreement (R. 43-48) was executed on March
13, 1962, by the respondent in an effort to settle this
case. (R. 152). However, the appellant stated there
would be no settlement. (R. 154 and 158). Yet on April
17, 1962, which was the last hearing before the hearing
on July 29, 1963, counsel for both the appellant and
the respondent represented in open court "that they
were in the process of working out this trust agreement
4
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and that if the trust agreement was worked out satisfactorily, . . . that this proceeding could be deemed
dismissed." (R. 139). On May 8, 1962, in Chicago,
Illinois, the respondent and the appellant as the Conservator to Collect the Estate of respondent, signed a
Trust Agreement with the First National Bank of
Chicago. (R. 76-83).
On June 28, 1963, counsel for respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the petition (R. 74) on two grounds
and one of these was "that a trust agreement had been
executed by Joan Oelerich, the petitioner, and the First
National Bank of Chicago." An order of dismissal was
signed by the court on August 12, 1963, after a hearing
on July 29, 1963. (R. 91).
Counsel for petitioner moved to vacate the order
of dismissal on August 20, 1963. (R. 94). A hearing
was held on August 26, 1963 to argue this motion.
(R. 134-148). On September 11, 1963, the court issued
a Further Memorandum Decision (R. 127) in which
it denied the petitioner's motion for a rehearing and
reaffirmed the grounds for dismissal.

POINTL
T H E COURT D I D NOT E R R IN DISMISSI N G T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E G R O U N D
THAT A TRUST AGREEMENT WAS ENT E R E D INTO.
5
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A. The court did not err in dismissing the petition
on the ground that the parties, through counsel, in open
court agreed to a dismissal if the trust agreement was
entered into by the parties and a bank.
On April 17, 1962, counsel for both parties to this
action represented in open court that this petition would
be dismissed if a trust agreement was consummated.
The trust agreement was signed on May 8, 1962, in
Chicago. No action was taken to dismiss the case until
June 28, 1963, when the respondent moved for dismissal. The court granted a dismissal on the basis that
the parties, through their counsel, had consummated an
agreement for dismissal.
I t is well settled that parties of record to a suit
who are under no dsability and are suing or defending
for themselves alone may agree at any time to the dismissal of the action or defense, with or without prejudice, because they have the absolute control of the litigation at every stage of the proceeding, from its
inception to, and after, the final judgment. 17 Am. Jur.
103.
Since the terms of the agreement for dismissal
were presented by counsel for the respective parties, the
crucial question becomes did counsel for the petitioner
have the authority to dismiss or to settle the case?
An attorney of record is generally held to have
implied authority to enter or take a dismissal, discontinuance, or nonsuit that does not bar the bringing of
6
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another suit on the same cause of action. These procedural steps have been described as a dismissal or other
termination without prejudice. 7 Am J u r 2d 126. The
order issued in this case does not state whether the
dismissal is with or without prejudice. (R. 91). Therethere, it would seem to be a dismissal without prejudice.
Rule 41(a) (1) U.R.C.P. See also 56 A L R 2d 1290.
In the case of Gagnon Company v. Nevada Desert
Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P . 2d 466, the California
Supreme Court held that an attorney had authority to
commence an action and to dismiss it with prejudice.
The discussion of that phase of the case at pages 474
and 475 includes concepts supporting respondent's
contention. There the court stated:
"With reference to an attorney's authority to
dismiss his client's action with prejudice it is said:
'An important problem is related to the distinction between voluntary dismissals or nonsuits
which are without prejudice to the cause of action,
and dismissals or nonsuits with prejudice, the last
mentioned type being referred to in the cases by
the common-law term 'retraxit.' It is clearly
within the attorney's authority to dismiss the
client's action without prejudice.
(Emphasis
added). However, a series of early cases held the
general authority of an attorney even sufficient
to empower him to effect a retraxit, amounting
to a renunciation of the client's substantive right
or cause of action. I t is hardly possible to reconcile this rule with the established principle that
the implied general authority of an attorney does
not include any power or authority to dispose of
the client's substantive rights, and it would there-
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fore seem doubtful whether, or to what extent,
the early cases would now be followed.' (6 Cal.
Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law § 164.) And further
in that connection: 'In civil litigation, the attorney, as the client's agent, and in the absence of
fraud, has authority to bind his client in all matters pertaining to the regular conduct of a case.
* * * I n the absence of such special instructions,
the conduct and management of the action is
entrusted to the attorney's judgment; he decides
what should be contested, what points should
be taken, and what should be abandoned. This
authority is, however, subject to the qualification that an authority ordinarily does not have
implied authority to do an act which will effect
the surrender or loss of a client's substantial
rights, for the client determines 'the objectives
to be attended.' . . . There is, however, a presumption that he has authority to compromise
his client's action which he is prosecuting. . . .
Defendant Burke points out that there are
authorities in California and Nevada which hold
that on collateral attack the presumption of the
attorney's authority is conclusive . . . and it has
been held that an attorney has authority to dismiss an action with prejudice, the modern name
for retraxit . . . contrary to the rule at common
law. . . . While the above cited cases may appear
to conflict with the rule that ordinarily an attorney has no authority to surrender his client's
rights (see quotation, supra, from 6 Cal. Jur.
2d, Attorneys at Law, § § 156, 164), they may
be reconciled on the theory that there is a rebuttable presumption that he had such authority."
The court went much further in the Gagnon Company case than the trial court did in the case now before
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the Supreme Court. The California court was concerned
with an attorney's authority to dismiss an action with
prejudice but along the road to its final conclusion the
court made it clear that an attorney has the authority
to dismiss a suit without prejudice. Counsel for respondent believe that the above cited case is well reasoned and justifies fully the contention that the appellant's attorneys had authority to stipulate and agree
to a dismissal without prejudice.
Respondent is not unmindful of Section 78-51-32,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides:
"An attorney and counselor has authority:
. . . (2) To bind his client in any of the steps of
an action or proceeding by his agreement filed
with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of
the court, and not otherwise."
Although this section deals with an attorney's
authority to bind his client under certain circumstances,
it does not exclude other powers or authority necessarily
involved in the attorney-client relationship. State v.
Froah, 220 Iowa 840, 263 N.W. 525. I t is respondent's
position that this section is inapposite to the case at
bar, because the agreement was made in open court
before the District Judge with jurisdiction to hear and
dispose of the issues before him and the appellant's
attorney had authority to move for or agree to a dismissal without prejudice.
There has been one Utah case where the Utah
Supreme Court considered this section. In McWhirter
9
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v. Donaldson, 36 U. 293, 104 P . 731, defendant claimed
an oral stipulation had been entered into between counsel for the respective parties extending the time for
answering the complaint. The court held that since the
stipulation was neither filed with the clerk nor otherwise made a matter of record, the defendant could not
rely upon the stipulation. However, in the McWhirter
case, the stipulation was not entered into in open court
but was between the counsel outside the court. Certainly
it appears to counsel for respondent that had an extension been requested in court in the presence of both
counsel and an agreement effectuated a different result
would have been reached. I t is to be remembered that
in the present matter, counsel for both parties agreed
to a dismissal before the Judge in court. Although the
trial Judge did not enter this agreement upon the
minutes of the court at that time, the Judge recalled
the agreement and dismissed the petition upon the basis
of counsel's representations. (R. 140). While the Utah
Supreme Court has not discussed the purpose of this
section, it did quote a California case, Borkheim v.
N. B. & M. Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 623, which stated that without such a rule "the court would be frequently annoyed
by disputes between counsel concerning their agreements, and thus forced to try innumerable side issues
more perplexing than the case itself, attended, also,
with delays to its business, and the detriment to the
public service." The trial judge in this matter did not
have to worry about what the parties through their attorneys stipulated about because he was present when
10
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the agreement was made. When the reason for a rule
fails, the rule fails.
For a discussion of the purpose of this statute, a
look to another state would be appropriate. An identical
provision appears in the Montana statutes, Section 932101(1), Repl. Vol. 7, Revised Codes of Montana,
1947. The Supreme Court of Montana in Bush v. Baker,
46 M. 535, 129 P . 550, 553, stated that "the purpose of
such a rule is to promote orderly procedure and protect
the rights of litigants, and may not be invoked to perpetrate a wrong. The rule in question here was enacted
to relieve the presiding judge of the necessity of determining controversies between counsel as to their unexecuted agreements, often more perplexing than the
case itself."
Since the Montana Court takes the same view as
the California Court as to the purpose of this statute,
respondent contends the statute should not be extended
to include in-court agreements because the trial judge
did not have to determine a controversy between counsel
where he was present when the agreement was made.
The agreement involved in this matter was not filed
with the clerk nor was it entered upon the minutes of
the court. However, in the case of Rackham v. Rackham,
23 P . 2d 566, the Utah Supreme Court recognized an
oral stipulation entered into in open court. Of course,
the party, who later objected to the stipulation, was
present at the time the stipulation was made and the
court inferred she acquiesced in the action by her coun11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sel. Certainly, it should be inferred that the appellant
in this case acquiesced in her counsel's representations.
From the time the petition was filed on December 21,
1961, until April 17, 1962, there was great activity on
the part of both parties. From April 17, 1962, when the
court ordered that the matter be taken under advisement (R. 68) until April 16, 1963, when petitioner's
attorneys withdrew (R. 72), appellant took no action
to proceed. It would seem when she signed the trust
agreement on May 8, 1962, that she ratified and acquiesced in her attorneys' oral agreement.
As pointed out in Bush v. Baker, supra, this statute
was enacted to relieve the presiding judge of the necessity of determining controversies between counsel as
to their unexecuted agreements. The Judge could not
possibly remember all agreements entered into in open
court. Therefore, the theory of entering such agreements
on the minutes of the court is a sound one. However,
the respondent should not be denied a dismissal, where
counsel agreed in open court to dismiss the petition if
a trust agreement was consummated (R. 139-140),
merely because the court inadvertently failed to have
such agreement entered on the minutes, especially in
view of the fact that the court remembered clearly what
counsel represented.
B. Assuming the court erred in dismissing the
petition on the basis that an oral argument for dismissal
had been entered into in open court, the court did not
err in finding that the trust agreement was a valid
12
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substitute for a guardianship procedure insofar as the
assets and person of the ward are concerned and dismissing on that ground.
The appellant in her petition for appointment of
a guardian (R. 5-6) prayed that the Walker Bank
and Trust Company be appointed guardian of the
person and estate of Joan Oelerich. Appellant's petition was primarily concerned with protecting the money
that respondent was to receive from her father's estate.
The trust agreement provided that the money received
by respondent from her father's estate would be placed
in a trust with the First National Bank of Chicago.
The bank as trustee is responsible for the safe keeping
of the money and for applying a portion of the annual
net income of the trust to the health, support, mainten-*
ance, and education of the respondent. If Walker Bank
and Trust Company were appointed the general guardian of Joan Oelerich, what duties would it perform?
Respondent contends that the First National Bank
of Chicago now performs under the trust, the very
functions and duties contemplated to be performed by
the Walker Bank under our guardianship statutes.
What more could Walker Bank do that the trustee
bank in Chicago is not doing or authorized to do ? Appellant through the trust already has what she seeks
through the petition which should render the issues
raised by these proceedings moot.
If respondent accepts appellant's argument that
the motion may be regarded as one for summary judg13
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ment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P., it is clear that appellant
had ample opportunity to submit affidavits or to make
any other appropriate showing essential to justify
petitioner's opposition to the motion. The motion to
dismiss was filed on June 28, 1963, (R. 74-75), and it
was not to be heard until July 25, 1963. As a matter of
fact, it was heard on July 29, 1963 (R. 91), a month
after appellant's counsel had notice of such motion.
A copy of the trust agreement (R. 76-83) was
before the court prior to the time the court dismissed
the petition. The fact that the trust agreement was
effective at the time of the hearing on July 29, 1963,
was acknowledged by appellant's counsel. (R. 140).
A reading of the trust agreement clearly demonstrates
that the property received by the respondent from her
father's estate is protected from artful and designing
persons. That the petition for appointment of guardian
was primarily concerned with the protection of the
property the respondent was to receive from her father's
estate is evident from the wording of paragraph 2 of
the trust. (R. 5). I t provides that, "The Grantors
hereby irrevocably sell, transfer, assign and deliver to
the Trustee the property described in the attached
schedule. That property,. . . shall be held, administered
and disposed of in trust upon the terms and conditions
hereinafter set forth." Article I gives the Trustee
power to accumulate the annual net income of the trust
and add it to the principal at the end of each year.
However, the Trustee may pay or apply for the benefit
of the respondent such portion of the annual net income
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in such manner and for such purposes as shall be
necessary or advisable for the health, support, maintenance or education of respondent or any of her children.
(R. 76). Thus, it can be seen that for at least ten years
(R. 77) the Trustee has complete control of the property, which the respondent received from her father's
estate. (R. 83).
The appellant at page 17 of her brief argues that
the court should have taken evidence to determine what
effect different fact situtaions would have on the question of whether the respondent could convey her interest
in the trust. Article I V (R. 81) should put to rest the
question of whether or not the respondent can convey
her interest. Under this provision, "no beneficiary of
this trust shall have the right to alienate, encumber,
hypothecate or anticipate any interest in the capital or
income of the trust estate in any manner."
Petitioner on page 16 of her brief states that there
is nothing in the record to indicate that respondent does
not own other assets or that she will not acquire other
assets. The record shows (R. 66-67) that counsel for
respondent petitioned the court for temporary support
on April 17, 1962, because respondent and her daughter
were "financially destitute" and were "required to accept the bounty of friends for the bare necessities of
life." Unless this allegation was false—a charge no one
makes—this statement would support an inference that
respondent had no other assets at that time. Again, is
it fair to assume that appellant would make a gift to
15
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the respondent, when she asserts respondent is subject
to being deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons? (R. 5). Should appellant be so motivated
the trust funds could be increased and such gifts would
be protected by the Trustee, the First National Bank
of Chicago.
The trial judge's ruling was not adverse to the
holdings of this court in Kidman v. White, 14 U. 2d
142, 378 P . 2d 898, or in Samms v. Eccles, 11 U. 2d
289^ 358 P . 2d 344. In the Kidman case, the court was
concerned with interpreting the provision in a contract.
The provision was ambiguous and the Supreme Court
declared that any doubts concerning the language
should be resolved by a court and jury rather than by
summary judgment. However, that holding is of no
moment in this case for here the language of the trust
is clear and unambiguous. Appellant has not pointed
to one provision which is doubtful, or which would indicate that respondent's property received from her
father's estate is not protected from artful or designing
persons. The Samms case, as this court is well aware,
involved an action by the plaintiff for severe emotional
distress. This court was concerned with whether or not
the plaintiff could establish a right to recovery and
declared that a motion for summary judgment was not
appropriate, assuming the contentions of the plaintiff
to be true. The matter before the trial court here involved the dismissal of a petition for the appointment
of a guardian. The appellant was not seeking to recover
damages, as in the Samms case. The thrust of the peti16
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tion was directed towards protecting the property of
respondent, derived from her father's estate. If we
assume this motion to be for a summary judgment,
the trial court by dismissing, in effect found there was
no need for appointment of a guardian of the property,
because the trust agreement prevented the respondent
from managing or taking care of the said property and
protected said property from artful or designing persons.
Going one step further and assuming the trusi
instrument adequately safeguarded the property during
the term ofthe trust, it did not fail to supply the needs
of a guardian for the person of the respondent.
Provision for the appointment of guardians or committees for insane and other incompetent persons is
quite generally made by statutes which, although possessing some similarity, vary in the different states. The
protection of property is one of the main objects of such
statutes, although they not infrequently authorize
guardianship both of the person and of the estate. 25
Am J ur 17
Section 75-13-29, U.C.A. 1953, states, "Every
general guardian has the care and custody of the person
of his ward, and the management of all his estate until
such guardianship is legally terminated." Section 7513-31, U.C.A. 1953, describes the duties of guardians
of a person, "A guardian of the person shall be charged
with the custody of the ward, and must look to his
support, health and education." Section 75-13-32,
17
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U.C.A. 1953, holds that, "A guardian of the property
must keep safely the property of his ward." Of course,
the Utah statutes contemplate guardians of the person
and guardians of the property. However, as pointed out
above, one of the main objects of such statutes is the
protection of property belonging to an incompetent.
As argued above, the trust agreement meets the
requirement of our law with respect to the duties of
guardains of property. The trustee keeps safely the
known property of respondent, the alleged incompetent.
(R. 76-82). Under this trust agreement, there would
be no need to have a guardian of property. And if there
was such a guardian, what property would he protect?
None but the property protected by the present trustee.
With respect to the guardian of a person, it is
respondent's position that the trial court ruled properly, because the trustee under the provisions of the trust
agreement also performs the duties of a guardian of a
person as specified in Section 75-13-31. The petition
contains no allegation that the respondent is physically
incapacitated and if that is a future contingency the
First National Bank of Chicago may pay to or apply
for the benefit of respondent such portion of the annual
net income of the trust in such manner and for such
purposes as shall be necessary or advisable for the
health, support, maintenance or education of respond,
ent. In effect, the trustee also has custody of the respondent. Custody is defined in Black's Law Dictionary
as, "The care and keeping of anything." By the terms
18
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of the trust, the trustee is responsible for paying a portion of the trust's annual income to take care of respondent with respect to her health, support, and maintenance.
If the petition were granted and letters of guardianship were issued to Walker Bank & Trust Company
and if there was any property for the bank to keep
safely, it would be the same as that kept by the Chicago
bank which would result in duplicate charges for the
same services. And if the Walker Bank had no property
to administer it would not and could not perform the
duties outlined in Section 75-13-31. All of the sections
from 75-13-33 to 75-13-44, which follow the sections
on duties of guardians of persons and of estates, contemplate that a guardian will have property of the ward
to administer. Certainly no bank and trust company
is equipped to furnish nursing or custodial service for
incompetents as its functions are financial.
For the foregoing reasons the trial court did not
err when it decided to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the trust agreement protected the respondent's
property, derived from her father's estate, ami consequently, there was no need for a guardian for the person
or the property.
C. Assuming that Section 78-51-32(2), IT.C.A.
1953 should be complied with in order for an agreement
of dismissal between counsel to be binding, the petitioner
should be equitably estopped, from, relying on said
statute.
19
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As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Corporation, 4 U. 2d 155,159, 289 P . 2d 1045, quoting J . T.
Fargason Co. v. Furst, 8 Cir., 287 F . 306, 310:
"Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the notion that, when one person makes representations
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a
given way, the one making such representations
will not be permitted to change his position when
such change would bring about inequitable consequences to the other person, who relied on the
representations and acted thereon in good faith.
* * * The representations must be in themselves
sufficient to warrant the action taken, and their
sufficiency is a judicial question. I t is not enough
that the person who heard them deemed that he
was warranted in acting as he did; the language
used ought of itself to furnish the warrant. One
man might consider himself warranted in acting
upon representations wholly insufficient to move
a more careful and prudent person."
Counsel for petitioner-appellant in open court represented that if respondent would sign a trust agreement,
the petition would be dismissed. (R. 139-140). Respondent relying on the representations executed the
trust agreement on May 8, 1962. Certainly, respondent
could only assume, as the trial judge did (R. 140), that
petitioner's counsel were authorized to make such statements. Appellant should be estopped from asserting
the technicality that the agreement was not entered on
the minutes of the court, especially in view of the fact
that respondent relied on the representations made by
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appellant's counsel in open court and that respondent
by signing the trust agreement relinquished possession
and control of her share of her father's estate, which
was estimated to be in excess of $250,000 00 (R„ 5).
In considering an identical provision (to Section
78-51-32(2)) of the Code of Civil Procedure <if California, in Reclamation District of Sacramento Co. \
Hamilton, 112 Cal. 603, 44 Pac. 1074, the Supreme
Court of that state said:
"If, under the terms of a mutual stipulation
which was only verbal, one party has received
the advantage for which he entered into it, or the
other party has at his instance given up some
right or lost some advantage, so that it would
be inequitable for him to insist that the stipulation was invalid, he will not be permitted to repudiate the obligation of his own agreement
upon the ground that it had not been entered in
the minutes of the court."
The reasoning of the California case is applicable
to this matter now before the court. I t would be inequitable to allow the appellant to assert the statute
and to insist that the stipulation was invalid because
of a technicality where the respondent has signed a trust
agreement in reliance on appellant's attorney's statements in open court, which prevents IUT i'vum having
control of her inheritance for at least ten years and **;;
the other hand merely results in requiring the appellant
to institute another action if she concludes there is merit
in her claim.
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POINT II
T H E COURT D I D NOT E R R IN DISMISSI N G T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E G R O U N D O F
F A I L U R E TO P R O S E C U T E W I T H D I L I GENCE.
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., provides that a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action for failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute. The Utah rule is similar to Federal Rule 41 (b). Rule 41 (b) clearly places dismissal for
failure to prosecute in the court's discretion. 5 Moore's
Federal Practice, p. 1036. Since the order of dismissal
for failure to prosecute is discretionary, it will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there has been abuse of discretion. 5 Moore's Federal Practice 1039. Accordingly,
the question to be determined is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute.
What constitutes "failure to prosecute", of course,
depends on the facts of the particular case, 5 Moore's
Federal Practice 1037. Neel v. Barbara, 136 F . 2d 269.
I n the present case, the petition for appointment of a
guardian was filed on December 21, 1961. (R. 5, 6).
From that time until April 17, 1962, appellant's counsel were engaged in the prosecution of this petition,
as shown by the record. For instance, on January 28,
1962, petitioner's counsel filed a notice to take the
depositions of three doctors. (R. 13). Again on February 9, 1962, they filed a notice setting aside trial date
and setting the matter for pretrial. (R. 21). On March
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6, 1962, counsel for petitioner filed a notice to take the
deposition of respondent (R. 25), ;u-d <>.• Man-h ;,
1962, a motion for order to compel her =.» Mihnul ..»
mental examination was filed (R. 2 6 ) . F u r t h e r , answers
to request for admissions signed by appellant under
Rule 36 were filed on March 12, 1962. Petitioner filed
an affidavit with the court on March 16, 1962. On
April 17, 1962, counsel for appellant appeared at a
hearing concerning a number of motions.
;•. ^
F r o m that date i iiitil J : J \ !-<• !!H,:>. -;•••* \|«-il;i; -. •
Baker, as new counsel for appellant, filed a m<>ii<»n I'morder to compel respondent to submit to mental examination, there had been no prosecution of the action. I t
must be noted that the motion for dismissal on the
ground that petitioner had not been diligent in proceeding with the action was filed J u n e 28, 1963, over a year
and two months after the petitioner had last proceeded
and before appellant took any a d inn n* n\nw ahead.
On the basis of the above facts, it is difficult to see how
the trial j u d g e abused his discretion. I n Salmon v. City
of Stuart, Florida, 194 F . 2d 1004, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the trial court was authorized in dismissing an action under Rule 41 ( b ) , Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, where following the filing
of the suit, no action was taken in it bj the plaintiffs
for one year and three months. W h e r e a petition for
the appointment of a guardian has been filed and when
such petition alleges that " J o a n Oelerich .
by reason
of her mental condition, . . . is unable, unassisted, to
properly manage and take care of her property, and
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is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or
designing persons" (R. 5), it would seem incumbent
upon the petitioner that she prosecute the action with
diligence. By waiting over a year, the petitioner left
the respondent in a precarious position if she is incompetent as alleged. How could the court abuse its discretion under such facts as these? The proper answer
is it did not.
Respondent is not unmindful of the Utah cases
cited in appellant's brief and the rationale of those cases.
In Wright v. Howe, et al., 46 U. 588, 150 P . 956, the
court was confronted with the ruling of a trial court in
denying defendants' motion to dismiss "for the reason
that the plaintiff herein has failed and neglected to
prosecute said action with reasonable diligence." The
court said at page 589, "The defendants had the same
right to press to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and especially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they
cannot complain." In the present matter, the respondent
may have had the right to press to trial but she was
unaware of it and in fact understood the petition would
be dismissed when she executed the trust agreement. If
the petitioner argues she was not bound by the statement of her counsel in open court, then appellant was
obligated to proceed with the action. The reasoning
of the Wright case is not applicable to the facts of this
case. On application for rehearing the Supreme Court
made the following observation at pages 595 and 596:
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"It is contended that we erred in not reversing
the judgment, for the reason that the trial court
erred in not sustaining appellants' motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute the
action, and that we failed to pass or at least
failed to sufficiently state our reasons in passing,
upon that assignment in the original opinion.
There is not the slightest merit to the contention.
The case had been at issue about three years. In
this state, if an action be determined otherwise
than upon the merits, the plaintiff may, within one
year thereafter, bring another of the same cause
of action regardless of the statute of limitations,
provided only that the original action was timely
begun. A defendant moving to dismiss, although
his motion be sustained, can gain no permanent
advantage, since the plaintiff has the right at
any time within a year to bring another action.
In view of that fact, the whole matter of whether
a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution
should be sustained or not should be permitted
to rest within the sound discretion of the trial
courts. If those courts, therefore, refuse to dismiss the action on that ground, we should not
interfere unless and until it is clearly made to
appear that the defendant in the action has been
prejudiced in some substantial right."
In the Wright case, the court sustained the trial court's
refusal to dismiss and noted that the Supreme Court
would not interfere until it appeared "that the defendant in the action has been prejudiced in some substantial
right." Following this rationale, this court should not
interfere with the trial court's decision in dismissing
this case. The petitioner has not been prejudiced in
some substantial right, ^lie <\*m nlwav--.- Hie another
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petition for the appointment of a guardian, if she has
reasonable grounds to believe the respondent is incompetent.
In the Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins,
8 U. 2d 389, 335 P . 2d 624 case, the court held that it
was an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice
for failure to prosecute where either party had an opportunity to obtain the relief to which it was entitled.
Such a holding would not be applicable to this case,
because respondent had no opportunity to proceed,
since she assumed the opposing attorneys had authority
to act for appellant and understood the signing of the
trust agreement would result in dismissal of the petition. (R. 139-140). In the Crystal Lime case the court
at page 392 noted respondent's argument that Rule
41(b) applies to plaintiffs and not defendants who fail
to prosecute and that this rule was enacted for the
benefit of defendants to save them annoyance and
harassment by plaintiffs who file suits but fail to prosecute them with diligence. The court stated, "Respondents' contention might be very persuasive if they had
not filed counter claims in the action. . . . " I n the
present matter before the court a petition was filed for
appointment of a guardian, and that was the basis of
the action before the court. From the above language,
it would seem that this court ought to accept the argument presented by respondent in the Crystal Lime
case when applied to the facts of the present matter.
For a period of one year and two months, appellant
took no action to proceed with the petition. Respondent
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

therefore contends that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing this case.
The Crystal Lime case involved a quiet title action.
The Wright case was concerned with a claim for dam
ages resulting from negligence of the defendant, which
caused the death of four horses and injured a fifth
horse. This case presently before the court involves a
petition for appointment of a guardian. The competency of the respondent is in question. Certainly, it is
incumbent for the petitioner to proceed with the case,
especially in view of the fact that she believes respondent to be incapable of taking care nf H iscf and her
property. Respondent and the court understood that
the petition would be dismissed when a trust agreement
was executed. Respondent signed the agreement and
there was no need to move the case ahead, since she
believed the petition would be dismissed. (R. 140-141).
However, if appellant had no understanding concerning dismissal of the petition, she was not diligent in
proceeding with the action and the court acted properly
in dismissing for lack of prosecution.

P E T I T I O N E R W A S N O T E N T I T L E D TO
AN A D J U D I C A T I O N O F T H E I S S U E S TN
H E R P E T I T I O N ON I T S M E R I T S .
The issue of respondent's competency was not
before the court at the hearing on Jiily 29, 1968. That
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hearing was held for the purpose of determining
whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the
grounds that appellant had not been diligent in proceeding with the action and that a trust agreement had
been signed by petitioner, respondent, and the First
National Bank of Chicago. If the appellant was not
diligent in proceeding with the action, the court had
the power under Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., to dismiss the
action without a hearing on the merits. If the attorneys
for petitioner represented in open court that the case
would be dismissed when the trust agreement was
signed, the court had a right to dismiss the case in accordance with such representations, because the petitioner was bound by the agreement and the court so
held. (R. 140). Such action by the court does not constitute a denial of due process of law for when the court
dismissed on the basis of the executed trust agreement,
it was merely carrying out what petitioner, through
her counsel, had agreed to do. Following Rule 41(b)
certainly could not be a denial of due process.
Petitioner's counsel had adequate notice of the
hearing for dismissal—from June 28, 1963, until the
hearing on July 29, 1963. There was certainly time to
file affidavits or prepare evidence for the hearing within
that period. At least as early as July 29,1963, appellant
was aware of the reasons the Judge was advancing
for dismissal and if she claims no agreement existed
concerning dismissal of the petition, from July 29,
1963, until August 26, 1963, when the hearing on the
motion to vacate was heard, petitioner had sufficient
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opportunity to gather evidence for presentation to the
effect of the trust agreement on the relief demanded
by petitioner and yet she did not come forward with
any evidence to support her position. Most certainly
petitioner cannot now complain about lack of due process, when she had ample opportunity to produce evidence in opposition to respondent's motion and neither
offered to nor introduced any.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Trial court predicated its order for dismissal on
the theory that petitioner, through her counsel, agreed
to dismiss the petition if the trust agreement was signed.
Such trust agreement was signed by petitioner, respondent, and a Chicago bank. Judge Hanson merely
ordered what petitioner had agreed to do through her
counsel in open court.
Appellant is estopped from relying on Section
78-51-32(2), U.C.A. 1953, and from contending that
the stipulation for dismissal is not binding.
The trust agreement was acceptable to appellant
as she operated under it for a period of 14 months. I t
safeguards respondent's property received from her
father's estate, as required by a guardian of property
in Utah. The trustee by the terms of the trust must
look to respondent's support, health and education, as
required by the guardian of a person under Utah law.
The appellant by means of the trust has secured what
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she prayed for in the petition and therefore the trial
judge did not err in dismissing the petition.
Assuming the petitioner was not found by the
agreement for dismissal, then she was guilty of laches
in not proceeding with the action. To wait over a year
before taking any action with respect to this incompetency matter is unreasonable and should not be allowed,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
invoked Rule 41(b).
If the petitioner is bound by the agreement for
dismissal, there was no need for a hearing on the merits.
Petitioner cannot complain about the denial of opportunity to be heard on the merits of the effect of the
trust agreement, when counsel had one month's notice
before the first hearing and another month's notice
before the hearing to set aside the order issued as a
result of the first hearing.
The order of dismissal should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of April,
1964.

PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & LATIMER
George W . Latimer
James B. Lee
1003 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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